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Introduction
For centuries, the process of jury decision making has been shrouded
in secrecy, permitting juries to decide cases without outside scrutiny.  But
in the last few decades, there have been increasing efforts to go inside the
black box of the jury in both the United States and other countries.  In the
2009 case of Taxquet v. Belgium, a panel of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) opened the lid, finding that the defendant’s right to a fair
trial was violated because the jury failed to provide sufficient reasoning to
support its verdict.1  Further, the court indicated that the questions the
judge posed to the jury had been “vague” and “general,” and as such, the
defendant could have “an impression of arbitrary justice lacking in trans-
parency.”2  In 2010, the Grand Chamber upheld this decision, although
the court noted that so long as other protections are available, the jury is
not required to provide reasons for the verdict to be valid.3  Nonetheless,
the Taxquet decision sends a strong signal to European lawyers and legisla-
tors about the desirability of jurors providing reasons for their verdicts.4
Increasingly, European countries are turning to trial procedures that
require extensive written reasoning to support legal decisions, including
decisions reached by lay fact-finders.5  Spain offers one contemporary
example: it restored its tradition of trial by jury following the death of the
dictator Francisco Franco.6  Rather than participating in free deliberation
and deciding on a general verdict as common-law juries typically do, the
Spanish jury receives a set of specific “yes or no” questions from the
judge.7  The jurors must indicate which charges and factual assertions they
believe were proved, whether the vote was unanimous or by majority, and
the vote count.  The jury then gives an overall verdict of “guilty” or “not
guilty.”8  Lastly, jurors must provide a written description of which pieces
of evidence they relied upon when reaching their decisions, including an
explanation of why they believe the evidence proved or did not prove cer-
tain facts.9  The trial judge subsequently reviews the jury answers and the
1. Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 15 (Jan. 13, 2009); Tax-
quet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 19 (Nov. 16, 2010). See Stephen C.
Thaman, Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts?: The Spanish Experience
and the Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 613 (2011) [hereinafter Thaman, The Spanish Experience].
2. Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 13, 2009).
3. Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26– 27 (Nov. 16, 2010).
4. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 625. R
5. See STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK
APPROACH 193 (2002) [hereinafter THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
6. Ley Orga´nica de 22 de Mayo art. I (B.O.E. 1995, 122) [hereinafter, LOTJ]; see,
e.g., Mar Jimeno-Bulnes & Valerie P. Hans, Legal Interpreter for the Jury: The Role of the
Clerk of the Court in Spain, 6 ON˜ATI SOCIO-LEGAL SER. 197, 200 (2016); Mar Jimeno-
Bulnes, Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain: Between Theory and Practice, 1(9) ON˜ATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SER. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Jimeno-Bulnes, Between Theory and Practice];
Nancy S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and Lay Participation: Ameri-
can Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 793 (2015).
7. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 628. R
8. Id. at 629.
9. Id.
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supportive reasoning and determines whether the responses meet legal
requirements.10
Opinions are divided over whether courts should require juries to pro-
vide reasons for their verdicts.  Some of the arguments in support of rea-
soned verdicts are that they promote careful reflection,11 reduce bias and
arbitrariness in jurors’ decisions,12 and ensure that jury nullification is
uncommon.13  Further, some argue that reasoned verdicts can contribute
to greater transparency and legitimacy and may be helpful upon appeal.14
Some of the arguments against reasoned verdicts are that they reduce jury
independence and undermine the power of the jury.  It may also be inap-
propriate to require lay fact-finders to engage in a form of reasoning that
requires extensive legal training.15
Some of the differences in opinion regarding reasoned verdicts seem to
stem from a general trust or mistrust of jury decision making.16  Countries
that show more trust in jury decision making tend to shy away from proce-
dural changes that would channel or otherwise limit jurors’ decision-mak-
ing tasks, while those less trusting of jurors or those who feel jurors should
behave more like judges tend to favor reasoned verdicts and structured
decisions.17
The reasoned verdicts debate resonates in the U.S. as well.  A parallel
discussion exists in the United States regarding the use of special verdicts
and general verdicts with answers to written questions.  In a true special
verdict, jurors do not return a general verdict, but instead “fin[d] certain
facts and leav[e] the rest to the court.”18  In a general verdict with written
questions, jurors provide answers to written questions of fact and provide a
general verdict.19
Kate Stith-Cabranes argues that juror accountability is an increasingly
important value.20  Jury decisions that include information concerning the
basis for their decisions— such as special verdicts and general verdicts with
answers to written questions— promote transparency.  In the recent case
Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a boost to the
10. See Jimeno-Bulnes, Between Theory and Practice, supra note 6, at 13– 14. R
11. Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line for 12 Angry Men: Verdicts Reached by
Majority Rule –  The Spanish Perspective, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 759, 774 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line].
12. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620. R
13. Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to a Jury Trial, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 241, 321 (1997) [hereinafter Thaman, Spain Returns].
14. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620 (describing benefits for R
appeals); 625 (describing benefits for transparency and legitimacy).
15. See Jimeno-Bulnes & Hans, supra note 6, at 202. R
16. See Marder & Hans, supra note 6, at 798. R
17. Id. at 798– 99.
18. Kate Nepveu, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal
Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2003).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
20. Stith-Cabranes discusses the importance of juror accountability and public
access to information. She concludes that the need for “greater equality, rationality, and
accountability” may trump the need for secrecy and confidentiality. Kate Stith-Cabranes,
The Criminal Jury in Our Time, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 133, 143 (1995).
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importance and value of accountability and transparency in jury ver-
dicts.21  The Court held that an exception to the longstanding rule that
jurors could not impeach their verdicts following trial was permissible in
cases in which racial bias may have infected the jury’s decision making.22
Allowing a post-trial inquiry into the content of jury deliberations under
these circumstances would “prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury
verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment
trial right.”23
As in the reasoned verdict debate, those for and against special ver-
dicts and general verdicts with answers to written questions disagree about
the extent to which these procedures enhance or undermine jury decision
making.  Additionally, greater transparency may come at a cost, thus weak-
ening the authority and power of the jury.24
The current legal debate regarding reasoned verdicts contains multiple
assertions about the psychological impact, some positive and some nega-
tive, of requiring juries to deliver publicly reasoned verdicts.  Though they
are central to the debate, many of these assertions remain unexplored.
How do jurors approach the task of fact finding when they are required to
supply reasons for their verdicts, or to answer specific questions about
their fact finding?  How might these cognitive processes differ from those
that they engage in as they deliberate and decide on a general verdict?  Are
reasoned verdicts likely to be successful in increasing jurors’ cognitive
processing of the evidence, and in enhancing their ability to apply legal
standards to the case at hand?  Can reasoned verdicts reduce arbitrary
judgments and biased decision making?  Further, by what metric should a
comparison be made between reasoned verdicts and verdicts of other
kinds?  Should courts consider the outcome accuracy, jury independence,
and the transparency and reviewability of decisions?  If so, how should the
courts balance these tradeoffs?
This Article explores the legal and psychological questions at the heart
of the debate over reasoned verdicts abroad, as well as the parallel debate
regarding special verdicts and general verdicts with answers to written
questions in the U.S.  There is no empirical work comparing these diverse
approaches directly.  Therefore, to assess the likely impact of requiring rea-
soned verdicts, this article draws on insights from psychological research
on human decision making, as well as empirical research on jury decision
making.
Review of the psychological research has led us to some surprising,
albeit preliminary, conclusions.  Although reasoned verdicts may be more
transparent, requiring lay fact-finders to provide reasons for their decisions
may have little to no positive impact on the quality of decision making.
Some studies suggest that reasoning about decisions occurs following deci-
21. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 869.
24. Nepveu, supra note 18, at 266.
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sions, rather than beforehand.25  If true, reasoned verdicts are unlikely to
promote sounder decision making in a jury context.  Furthermore, requir-
ing reasons or structuring verdicts may paradoxically lead to negative
effects, by unnecessarily complicating jurors’ and judges’ duties and
undermining the jury’s independence.
This Article ends with a call for empirical research of the effects of
requiring reasoned verdicts from juries.  The Article recommends that until
the effects of reasoned verdicts are confirmed to be largely positive, general
verdicts remain the best way to maintain the power of juries to reflect the
conscience of the community.
I. Reasoned Verdicts: Where and How Reasoned Verdicts are Used
It is useful to review practices in the countries that currently require
reasoned verdicts, special verdicts, or general verdicts with answers to writ-
ten questions.  Much variability exists in the structure and application of
such procedures.  However, for many courts, the aim is to provide a
stronger basis for verdicts by requiring reasons or by otherwise structuring
the decision-making process of jurors.  To show the range and detail of
implementing such verdicts, this section surveys countries that require
jurors to provide reasons for their verdicts.  Some countries utilize a more
classic jury model (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Russia, and Spain); others
employ mixed courts (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland).  This
Article explores several courts’ use of reasoned verdicts to highlight exam-
ples of, and differences between, the reasoning requirements.  It also distin-
guishes between general verdicts in the U.S. on the one hand, and the
alternative practices of special verdicts and general verdicts with answers to
written questions on the other.
A. The Reasoning Requirement in Classic Jury Systems
Classic jury systems allow jurors to deliberate independently, and
largely without input from external sources.  Below, several examples are
presented of countries with juries that deliberate separately from judges,
but that nonetheless require jurors to provide reasons for their verdicts.
This group of countries includes Spain, Belgium, Austria, and Russia.
While the list is not exhaustive, it provides a picture of how reasoning is
incorporated into traditional jury system procedures.
1. The Reasoning Requirement in Spain
The court system of Spain requires that jurors provide reasons for
their verdicts in criminal cases.26  Spanish judges prepare a verdict form
25. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The
Emotional Dog].
26. See MARIJKE MALSCH, DEMOCRACY IN THE COURTS: LAY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 52 (2009).
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consisting of a list of questions regarding the case and charges.27  The jury
receives the verdict form, directions, and the judge’s summary of the case
facts presented at trial.28  Jurors are asked to deliberate on, and answer,
each question included in the verdict form.  Jurors deliberate indepen-
dently of the judge.  For each crime and for each defendant, jurors must
address:
(1) the facts which prove the commission of the crime (corpus delicti) and
the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator; (2) the defense allegations; (3)
the facts which could completely justify or excuse the charged criminal acts;
(4) a narrative of the facts that determine the degree of execution or partici-
pation in the offense, or any statutory aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances; and (5) the “criminal act as to which the defendant must be
declared guilty or not guilty” . . . .29
The Ley Orga´nica de 22 de Mayo proposes a specific format that
jurors should utilize when drafting their verdict.30  Specifically, Ley Orga´n-
ica de 22 de Mayo requires that verdicts include “a succinct explanation of
the reasons why [the members of the jury] have declared, or refused to
declare, certain facts as having been proved.”31  Jurors must determine the
culpability for every offense.  They must also record the votes of jurors for
each question.32  In this unique system, majority rule decides verdicts; five
jurors (out of nine) are required to reach a decision on facts favorable to
the accused, while seven votes are required for facts unfavorable to the
accused.33  Jurors may request the law-trained clerk of the court to join
them in the deliberation room to assist them in writing their responses.34
The judge reviews the verdict form and the reasons provided by jurors
to determine the adequacy of their reasoning.35  This judicial review pri-
marily focuses on whether or not the jurors have met the requirement to
explain their reasoning.36  Judges reportedly take a range of approaches in
their review.  Judges may interpret reasons based on the “maximalist”
approach (the most strict interpretation), which requires that jurors pro-
vide an in-depth description of the entire process and include a determina-
27. See generally, e.g., Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 325 (citing several
fact patterns used in Spanish trials).
28. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 651; see generally Thaman, R
Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 322. R
29. Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 322 (citing § 52(2) LOTJ, reprinted in
Ley Del Jurado).
30. LOTJ, supra note 6. R
31. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 364 (citing § 61(1)(d) LOTJ,
reprinted in Ley Del Jurado).  In one case, the reason jurors gave for acquitting a defen-
dant was “witnesses.” See id. at 366 (citing MA-2).
32. See id. at 364; See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 628– 29. R
33. See Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 765; See Jimeno-
Bulnes, Between Theory and Practice, supra note 6, at 600. R
34. Jimeno-Bulnes & Hans, Legal Interpreter for the Jury, supra note 6, at 200; R
Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 627. R
35. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11; see LOTJ, supra note 6; R
Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 630. R
36. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 770– 72.
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tion as to whether specific facts have or have not been proven.37
Conversely, in the “minimalist” approach, judges interpret juror reasons
based on general references to the evidence rather than detailed
accounts.38  Lastly, verdicts may be assessed using an intermediate
approach.39  Here, jurors are required to provide itemized documentation
of the relevant evidence that they relied upon, and the judge may provide
the judicial reasoning after the jurors have completed their verdicts.40
Importantly, improperly reasoned or unreasoned verdicts can be contested
twice.41  Jury decisions can be reversed by the Magistrate-President of the
trial, as well as by appeals made to the Regional Supreme Court.42  Overall,
the utmost importance is placed on the quality and sufficiency of juror
verdicts.43
2. The Reasoning Requirement in Belgium
Beginning in 1930, Belgium expanded jury participation to include a
system of three judges and twelve jurors, with jurors deliberating indepen-
dently of the judge.44  For criminal cases, judges create question lists that
jurors must answer regarding elements of the crime, justifications, excuses,
and aggravating or mitigating circumstances.45  Before 2009, jurors were
not required to give reasons for their verdicts.  Instead, jurors were told to
follow their sincere belief or intime conviction:
The law does not ask jurors to account for how they reached their personal
conviction; it does not lay down rules on which they are to place particular
reliance as to the completeness and sufficiency of evidence; it requires them
to ask themselves questions, in silence and contemplation, and to discern, in
the sincerity of their conscience, what impression has been made on their
rational faculties by the evidence against the defendant and the submissions
of defence.46
If the panel of three judges deems that a jury reached an erroneous deci-
sion, the judges may set aside the verdict and order a retrial.47
In Taxquet v. Belgium, the ECtHR showed support for reasoned ver-
dicts.48  In this case, a defendant was convicted of murder of a government
official and of attempted premeditated murder of the official’s companion.
Thirty-two questions had been submitted to the jurors, all requiring a “yes”
37. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 634. R
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 771.
41. See Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 771– 72.
42. Id. at 772.
43. See, e.g., Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620. R
44. See generally MALSCH, supra note 26, at 33– 34; Thaman, The Spanish Experience,
supra note 1, at 621. R
45. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 621. R
46. Id. at 622.
47. Id.
48. See Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15 (Jan. 13, 2009);
Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19 (Nov. 16, 2010); Thaman, The
Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 625. R
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or “no” answer.49  Of these thirty-two questions, only four related to the
defendant Taxquet.50  Following his conviction, Taxquet appealed, listing
several factors which he argued influenced the verdict, including a broad-
cast that he indicated was prejudicial, his inability to examine an anony-
mous informant, and the jury’s verdict, which did not provide detailed
reasons for the jury’s responses to the questions.51  After his appeal was
denied in Belgium, the defendant took his case to the ECtHR, which deter-
mined that the defendant’s rights were violated because the defendant
could not determine from the responses to these questions why the jurors
had convicted him.52  As noted above, the Grand Chamber affirmed this
decision in 2010.53
Taxquet led to a substantial change in the process of jury deliberation
and verdict-making in Belgium.  Beginning in 2009, instead of allowing a
subjective standard of intime conviction, jurors must now provide reasons
for their decisions.54  As such, jurors independently deliberate, reach a ver-
dict, and then discuss their judgments with the panel of three judges who
help the jurors draft reasons for their verdict.  If the panel of judges deter-
mines that the jurors have erred in their reasoning regarding the evidence
or their application of legal concepts, the jury’s decision may be set
aside.55
3. The Reasoning Requirement in Other Classic Jury Systems
Austria employs classic juries, called jury courts, and mixed courts
consisting of lay and professional judges.  Juries are tasked with indepen-
dently deciding the most serious criminal offenses and those classified as
“political.”56  Jurors do not render general verdicts; rather, jurors must
respond to yes/no questions and must then give reasons for their deci-
sions.57  Jurors must provide short responses to each individual ques-
tion.58  In contrast to Spain, jurors receive no assistance in drafting their
reasons.59  Judges then review their responses and if they find the verdict
form is incomplete or contains contradictions, may ask jurors to correct
their decision form.60
49. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 623. R
50. Id.
51. Id. at 624.
52. Id. at 613.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 624.
55. Id. at 622– 24.
56. See Greg Taylor, Jury Trial in Austria, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 281, 284 (2011).
57. For example, the first question might be “Did D cause the death of V by {short
description of method} in {place} on {date}?”  A follow-up question might be “Did D act
in defense against an immediate and illegal attack?” Id. at 308.
58. These are sometimes limited.  For instance, in one case from 1988 involving two
brothers charged with robbery, the jurors acquitted one of the brothers.  In their reasons,
they said this acquittal was based on “the evidence of the victim.”  This particular judg-
ment and reasoning were contradictory to their judgment of the other brother and con-
tained very little in the way of reasoning. Id. at 312.
59. Id. at 307.
60. Id. at 311.
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In 1993, Russia introduced trial by jury for criminal cases.61  Jury tri-
als are used in cases involving aggravated murders, some serious felonies,
and some lesser crimes.62  After closing arguments, the judge prepares a
special question list that is submitted to the jury.63  Jurors must deliberate
on these questions for a minimum of three hours, unless the jury reaches a
unanimous decision before that time.64  If the jury cannot reach a unani-
mous verdict after three hours, it may return a verdict by a majority vote.65
After the jury has deliberated, the trial judge prepares the judgment based
on the jurors’ answers to the questions.66
In 1952, Switzerland became the first jurisdiction to require reasoned
verdicts in criminal jury trials.67  The Swiss Federal Court argued that
jurors’ judgments must include reasons for their decisions or must answer
“sufficiently specific questions.”68  In 1977, the parliament for the Canton
of Geneva required jurors to give reasons describing their choice of punish-
ment,69 and in 1992 began allowing jurors to “give succinct reasons in
cases where it felt its verdict might not be otherwise readily understood.”70
Similar to Spain, in 1996 the Genevan parliament amended its code and
began requiring reasons in response to each question on the question list
and determined that the clerk of the court could aid jurors in conveying
their reasons.71  Changes to federal procedures in 2011 largely abolished
jury trials in Switzerland.72  Now, only one canton— Ticino— maintains a
semblance of a jury, and even there a mix of professional judges and lay
assessor-jurors are used.73
B. The Reasoning Requirement in Mixed Jury Systems
Several mixed courts, which are decision-making bodies that combine
lay and professional judges, also require reasoned verdicts.  Below we dis-
cuss several examples of mixed courts that require reasons for verdicts.
In Italy, citizens participate as lay judges and are required to provide
reasons for their verdicts and votes in criminal trials.  Professional and lay
judges deliberate together, and every judge, including professional and lay
61. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury: Lessons for Jury-
Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 355, 358 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury].
62. Id. at 363.
63. Id. at 364.
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 626. R
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Gwladys Gillie´ron, Yves Benda & Stanley L. Brodsky, Abolition of Juries: The Swit-
zerland Experience, 25 THE JURY EXPERT 6, 8 (2015).
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judges, has a vote.74  The presiding judge leads the discussion and poses
questions to the judges pertaining to guilt and sentencing.  All judges
explain their reasoning and opinions, and then each judge must vote on
each question.  The voting is not secret, and all judges must provide rea-
sons in support of their decisions.  A professional judge subsequently
drafts the opinion summarizing the court’s decision.75
France’s classic jury system, which until the 1940s utilized lay jurors
who deliberated independently as in the classic jury approach, is now a
mixed court that consists of both lay and professional judges.76  Since
2011, in criminal trials— where jurors were once able to freely evaluate evi-
dence and come to a conclusion based on their intime conviction, or subjec-
tive certainty of guilt77— jurors must now provide reasons for their
decision.78  In 2011, the number of jurors was reduced from nine to six
and from twelve to nine for appeals.79
The presiding judge structures a set of questions pertaining to the
accused’s guilt and culpability.80  These questions typically include a
detailed set of issues, including charges and excuses.81  Collectively, the
professional and lay judges deliberate on these specific questions.  The
professional judges have the power to organize the deliberation and reason-
ing processes and must help lay judges apply their opinions and knowl-
edge to the evidence at hand.82  Professional and lay judges vote in secret
on all of the questions posed, and a majority vote is needed to support each
decision.83  The presiding judge drafts the judgment, summarizing the rea-
soning behind the group’s verdict and identifying the evidence that sup-
ports each decision.84  Deliberations are secret, so there is little direct
information about their content or about the role of the lay jurors in the
discussions.  However, one field study found that the power allotted to lay
judges appears to vary by presiding judge: At times, lay judges are given
74. See MALSCH, supra note 26, at 53; Valerie P. Hans & Anne Jolivet, Iron Fist in a
Velvet Glove? Judicial Behavior in Mixed Courts, COMP. L. & ECON. 182, 197 (2016).
75. See Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 197; Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra
note 1, at 634. R
76. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 191– 93. See generally THAMAN, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 5.  The mixed panel includes three professional judges R
(a president and two associate judges) and six “lay assessors.” See also Mathilde Cohen,
The French Case for Requiring Juries to Give Reasons. Safeguarding Defendants or Guarding
the Judges?, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 422, 422 (Jacqueline E. Ross & Steven
C. Thaman eds., 2016).
77. Valerie P. Hans & Claire M. Germain, The French Jury at a Crossroads, 86 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 737, 740 (2011).
78. Cohen, supra note 76, at 423.
79. Claire M. Germain, The Rise and Fall of Lay Participation in French Criminal
Courts, Presentation at Conference on Juries and Mixed Tribunals Across the Globe, at
5 (June 2014) (describing legal changes in French jury system) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with authors).
80. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 193.
81. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 615. R
82. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 194; see also Cohen, supra note 76, at 430.
83. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 193; Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra
note 1, at 615. R
84. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 192– 94.
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more latitude, while in other circumstances, the presiding judge is more
directive.85
C. General and Special Verdicts in the U.S.
1. General Verdicts
Most criminal jury trials in the United States only require the jury to
deliver a general verdict of guilty or not guilty.86  Jurors hear evidence,
receive jury instructions, and then retire to deliberate in private.  The delib-
eration is a free process without many procedural rules.  Once jurors have
discussed the case and the evidence and reached a conclusion about culpa-
bility, jurors then give a general verdict that is often required to be unani-
mous.  No reasons are required.  General verdicts are often also utilized in
civil trials in the United States.87
2. General Verdicts with Answers to Written Questions
Beginning in 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 49
allowed judges to order civil juries to use general verdicts accompanied by
questions that the jury must answer.88  A general verdict is rendered and
jurors must answer specific factual questions in writing.89  Responses to
the questions are meant to give the court insight into jurors’ comprehen-
sion and decision making.90
General verdicts with answers to written questions (formerly labeled
interrogatories) are employed more often in civil than in criminal cases.
The verdict and written responses to the questions must be consistent.91
When such questions are used in criminal cases, they may be used to deter-
mine mixed questions of fact and law.  This includes when jurors must
assess legal components within a defense, or during cases in which jurors
must determine which ground to convict on, or in cases involving options
of lesser included offenses.92  Written questions can also be employed dur-
ing sentencing to determine relevant facts, such as the presence of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances,93 issues of culpability,94 the amount of
85. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 195.  For a survey of the limited role that lay
judges play in mixed courts, see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkoviæ, Exploring Lay Participation in
Legal Decision Making: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 429– 30
(2007).
86. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180– 83 (1st Cir. 1969) (describing value
of the general verdict of the jury).
87. RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 182– 83
(11th ed. 2014) (describing the common usage of the general verdict in civil cases).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(1).
90. Kevin J. Wright, Misplaced Treasure: Rediscovering the Heart of the Criminal Justice
System Through the Use of the Special Verdict, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 409, 418 (2002).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 49; Elizabeth A. Larsen, Specificity and Juror Agreement in Civil
Cases, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 379, 379 (2002).
92. Nepveu, supra note 18, at 276– 78.
93. Id. at 270.
94. Id. at 274.
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a theft,95 or the danger that a defendant poses.96
3. Special Verdicts
FRCP 49 also allows for special verdicts.97  Special verdict forms are
meant to assist jurors by identifying and organizing key issues of fact.98
Special verdicts bear some similarity to the reasoned verdicts in some for-
eign courts.  When a special verdict is used, the jury provides written
answers to a series of questions pertaining to issues of facts in the case,
and the judge enters a verdict based on the jury’s factual findings.99
Unlike the use of special verdicts in civil cases, there is no rule of
criminal procedure similar to the FRCP 49 that permits such verdicts in
criminal cases.100  The use of special verdicts in criminal trials is contro-
versial because some scholars believe that it violates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury make the ultimate decision.101
D. Comparing Reasoned Verdicts, Special Verdicts, and General
Verdicts with Answers to Written Questions
As we will discuss further below, it is not clear how changes to the
verdict structure may affect the decision-making process of jurors, or how
jurors might approach these different decision-making tasks.  As noted
above, in Spain, jurors first answer “yes” or “no” to a list of factual ques-
tions, and describe in writing which facts have been proved and which have
not been proved.102  Then, jurors give an overall verdict of “guilty” or “not
guilty,” and lastly, describe in writing which pieces of evidence they relied
upon in answering the questions, and why they found each fact proved or
95. Id. (citing State v. Mickens, 462 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1990); People v. McCoy,
764 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1988); Hagberg v. State, 606 P.2d 385, 386 (Alaska 1980)).
96. Id. (citing State v. Sammons, 749 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Ariz. 1988)).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
98. See Jonathan Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of
Changes in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 435
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Procedural Innovations to Enhance
Juror Comprehension in Complex Litigation (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University) (on file with authors).  An additional option for change in
trial structure is the approach of bifurcation, in which claims and issues are tried and
decided separately but sequentially. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).  Bifurcation is employed
for “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Id.  However, it can
sometimes produce unexpected effects on decisions. See Stephan Landsman, Shari Dia-
mond, Linda Dimitropoulos & Michael J. Saks, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Para-
doxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 297,
298– 99, 333, 335 (1998) (finding, in a mock jury study, that bifurcation did not gener-
ally lead to improved juror comprehension, but caused changes in liability judgments
and punitive damage awards decisions).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 49; see also Casper, supra note 98, at 435; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 604 (1998);
Wiggins, supra note 98, at 25– 26.
100. See Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial
Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 535 (1994).
101. Nepveu, supra note 18 at 263 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510
(1995)); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 628– 29.
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not proved.103  For general verdicts with answers to written questions,
jurors first make an overall judgment of “guilty” or “not guilty” and then
provide written answers to questions of fact.104  Lastly, for special verdicts,
jurors do not provide an overall judgment, but instead provide answers to
questions of fact.105
In theory, jurors take to the above verdict tasks in the order provided
in jury instructions.  In some circumstances, however, jurors may not com-
plete these tasks in the prescribed order.  For instance, jurors required to
give reasons for their verdicts may, hypothetically, first come to an overall
determination of guilt (“guilty” or “not guilty”), might then go back to
answer the factual questions (“yes” or “no” as to which items are proved),
and may end with providing reasons for why they believe that the facts
were proved or not proved.  However, because jurors are not asked to give
an overall determination of guilt in special verdicts, they may proceed one
item at a time, in order, as questions are presented to them, without consid-
ering the case holistically.106  These potential differences in jurors’ deci-
sion-making processes may influence overall trial outcomes.  Because we
do not know how jurors approach each of these tasks, it is hard to deter-
mine how each might compare in terms of strengths and weaknesses.
In sum, in both the U.S. and foreign countries, courts have taken a
variety of approaches to attempt to get inside the black box of a jury’s
verdict.  Like Europe’s reasoned verdicts, the U.S.’s special verdicts and
general verdicts with answers to written questions aim to uncover the bases
for the jury’s decision.  Some courts ask juries to specify in writing the
reasoning that undergirds their verdicts, whereas others structure decision
making by asking juries to answer a court-imposed sequence of specific
questions.
II. Current Debate Regarding Reasoned Verdicts: Comparing
Reasoned, Special, and General Verdicts Through a
Psychological Lens
Scholars have highlighted many important considerations in the
debate about whether jurors should be required to provide reasons for their
verdicts.  Some say that such a requirement may safeguard against poor
decision making, while others maintain that it is detrimental to juror inde-
pendence and power.  Here, we identify and discuss competing claims
regarding reasoned versus general verdicts, and analyze a large body of psy-
chological literature that explores the capacities, strengths, and potential
weaknesses of human reasoning.  That work informs our understanding of
the potentially different cognitive processes that jurors may use in arriving
at these verdicts.  We apply these insights to the U.S. case of special and
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. However, as discussed in detail below, there is reason to believe that jurors, even
when using a special verdict, still base their judgments on their overall impressions on
the facts and witnesses. See infra Part II.
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general verdicts as well, although we keep in mind that reasoned and spe-
cial verdicts differ significantly.
A. Verdict Accuracy and Strength of Decision Making: Relevant
Psychological Research on Judgment and Decision Making
Perhaps the most significant and central issue of the debate over rea-
soned and structured jury verdicts, such as special verdicts, is whether they
increase verdict accuracy and the strength of the jury decision-making pro-
cess.  Some contend that requiring jurors to justify their decision may lead
to better, more deliberative decisions based first and foremost on evidence
rather than intuitions, emotions, or other factors.  For example, Steven
Thaman argues that in Europe “there is a conflict between the tradition of
the classic jury— which may decide according to their conscience or intime
conviction— and the requirement that judgments be reasoned to prevent
arbitrariness and to ensure an effective right to appeal.”107  Mar Jimeno-
Bulnes argues that the reasoned verdict “obliges jurors to participate in a
debate of sorts or at least forces them to reflect more carefully on their
decisions.”108  Reasoned verdicts may lead to stronger decisions that are
less arbitrary and more dependent on concrete evidence, as juries must
identify the specific evidence they used to support their conclusions about
each legal issue in the case.109  Research on deliberative democracy, which
emphasizes the value of citizens exchanging reasons supporting different
public policy choices, suggests that reason-giving could improve juries’
decision-making quality.110  In a parallel context, Doron Menashe explains
the value of requiring judges to provide the reasoning that supports their
decisions, stating that the “requirement of reasons brings judges to con-
sider matters brought before them with greater meticulousness, conscious
as they are of the fact that they will have to explicate their considerations
107. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620. R
108. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 774.
109. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 631 (citing Anexo, Informe R
Sobre la Aplicacion de la Lo del Tribunal del Jurado Desde el 1 de Abril de 1997 al 31 de
Marzo de 1998 (CGPJ), 13 ACTUALIDAD PENAL 615, 632 (2000)).  In one trial in Spain,
jurors were very thoughtful in their responses in which they rejected a defense that a
stabbing was an accident: “(d) The number and type of wounds which convinced the
jury that there was a struggle, and that the wounds were mortal and thus the possibility
of accident alleged by the defense was consequently eliminated; (e) With the corpulence
of the defendant and the lack of corpulence of the victim it would have been possible to
overcome the victim with other means.  The use of the knife and the type of wounds
convince the jury as to the intentionality of the defendant’s actions.”  Thaman, Spain
Returns, supra note 13, at 369 (citing Prot. Ver. (PM-2) (on file with authors)).
110. For a summary of empirical findings in deliberation democracy research, see
Nicole Curato et al., Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research, 146(3)
DAEDALUS 28, 28– 34 (2017) (summarizing research to date).  For an experiment explor-
ing the effects of reason-giving in the administrative agency context, see Edward H. Stig-
litz, Bureaucratic Reasoning, 24– 42 (June 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).  For an application of deliberative democracy theory to juries, see JOHN
GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY (2010).
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and grounds convincingly.”111
Supporters of general verdicts have several counterarguments about
the quality of general verdicts.  They argue that deliberations under a una-
nimity rule are inherently filled with reasoning and debate, even if a court
requires only a submission of a general verdict.  Jeffrey Abramson empha-
sizes the fact that “the jury is distinctly designed to encourage rational
deliberation.”112  Further, Robert Burns argues “the methods of the trial
are the methods best adapted to allow triers of fact properly to interpret
and evaluate the human actions that are always the topics of criminal tri-
als.”113  In the view of these legal commentators, jurors’ reasons for their
verdicts are already very clear, and based strongly on evidence.114  Requir-
ing that juries offer reasons for their verdicts and answer specific questions
is apt to have no impact or even negative effects on the quality of jury
decision making.115
Supporters of special verdicts focus on how they affect the quality of
jury decision making.  Some scholars argue that because special verdict
forms contain questions about separate, disputed factual issues, juries are
“better able to identify and understand contested issues” than if they are
instructed to reach a general verdict.116  James Henderson and his col-
leagues argue that by separating out complex issues in a given case with
multiple issues (e.g., during a product liability case, design defect, causa-
tion, and damages could all be contested issues), jurors are better able to
address each factual issue independently, rather than giving an overall,
gestalt determination that “feels right.”117  Further, Henderson and col-
leagues argue, since special verdicts separate out issues, jurors must con-
sider each piece independently and are discouraged from considering the
case holistically, which means they are less likely to “frame answers
according to some desired outcome.”118  Henderson and colleagues do
acknowledge that some juries may take a holistic approach even when
111. Doron Menashe, The Requirement of Reasons for Findings of Fact, 8 INT’L COMM.
L. REV. 223, 230 (2006).  Further, Menashe states that “detailed and methodical analy-
sis, conducted in writing, is far more likely to detect and rule out potential errors— and
thus to reduce the scope of the range of reasonableness— than offhand, unsystematic,
unwritten analysis.” Id. at 239.
112. Jeffrey Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 872
(2015).
113. Robert P. Burns, Some Limitations of Experimental Psychologists’ Criticisms of the
American Trial, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 899, 905 (2015).
114. See Richard O. Lempert, The American Jury System: A Synthetic Overview, 90
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 836– 37 (2015); see also Richard O. Lempert, The International-
ization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 477, 478 (2007) (describing research showing that “juries evaluated evidence
rationally and had other important strengths”).
115. See Abramson, supra note 112, at 875– 76; Burns, supra note 113, at 924;
Lempert, supra note 114, at 836– 37.
116. James A. Henderson, Fred Bertram & Michael J. Toke, Optimal Issue Separation
in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653, 1673 (1995).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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using special verdicts.119  They surmise that jurors may first decide the
case as a whole and then respond to individual questions by answering in a
way that each will lead to the already favored result.120  Even so, Hender-
son and colleagues maintain that, overall, special verdicts increase rational
decision making by controlling the jury, facilitating judicial review,
decreasing personal biases in decision making, and simplifying instruc-
tions for jurors.121  Pamela Stephens, too, has argued that judicial instruc-
tions would be less problematic under a regime of special verdicts.122
Jonathan Casper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of ver-
dict alternatives and notes that there is some anecdotal evidence— but little
systematic empirical evidence— that special verdicts increase juror compre-
hension and enhance the jury’s ability to organize testimony and legal
rules.123  Casper discusses the concern of some theorists that special ver-
dicts may generate systematic biases toward one side or the other.124  Spe-
cial verdicts might create anti-plaintiff bias because the jury is required to
make specific findings for the plaintiff on all issues, and because jurors are
tasked with an increased number of decisions.125  However, special ver-
dicts might give plaintiffs more opportunities for success in cases involving
multiple claims or ones with alternate theories.126  In line with this con-
cern, David Lombardero argues that the structure of special verdicts may
be biased in favor of plaintiffs during civil cases, while general verdicts may
often be favorable to defendants.127  In his view, because special verdicts
require jurors to answer questions in a specific order, Lombardero argues
that they “restric[t] the jury’s ability to reject collectively improbable multi-
ple-element claims,” and that the order of presentation will in fact deter-
mine the outcome of the trial.128  In contrast, Kevin Clermont argues that
jurors do not, and should not, consider any overall question in a case
regarding multiple elements.129  Instead, judges instruct jurors to apply the
119. Id. at 1675.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1672– 74.
122. See Pamela J. Stephens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of
Justification, 76 KY. L.J. 81, 142 (1987) (noting that special verdicts might assist jurors
as they mitigate the effect of confusing judicial instructions “by reducing the instruc-
tions that the judge gives. More broadly construed, by limiting the availability of the jury
trial or by expanding the situations in which the court may take the case away from the
jury, jury instructions and their contribution to reversals would decline substantially”).
123. Casper, supra note 98, at 437– 38.
124. Id. (citing Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to
Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 113 (1981)).
125. Id. at 438.
126. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury
Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 9 (1990); Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision
Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 215 (1972).
127. David A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-
Making?, 36 JURIMETRICS 275, 289– 90 (1996).
128. Id.
129. See Kevin M. Clermont, Common Sense on Standards of Proof (Cornell Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper No. 17– 36, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3007129 [https://
perma.cc/KEP8-6021].
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standard of proof to each element.
Several theories of memory and reasoning can help explain how jurors
reach general verdicts, and how a reasoning requirement or a structural
change, such as answering questions about their fact finding, might affect
their approach to reaching judgments.  The following sections describe: (1)
dual process models of judgment and decision making; (2) the story model
of juror decision making; (3) moral reasoning; (4) the phenomena of
predecisional distortion and motivated cognition; and (5) relevant jury
research.  We consider the debate over reasoned verdicts in light of these
psychological theories and research.
1. Dual-Process Models of Judgment and Decision Making
Dual-process models posit that humans make decisions and reason
about problems using two separate systems.  System I is a quick, intuitive,
and effortless processor that works spontaneously, while System II is
slower, more deliberative, and requires more effort.130  According to such
models, both systems are valuable and sophisticated processors of complex
information.131  System I often produces fast, intuitive judgments about
problems that arise, while System II monitors the quality of such intuitions
and helps correct or override them when necessary.  However, because
these processes are in competition, the rational/deliberative System II at
times loses control to intuitions.132  When intuitions gain control, people
are more susceptible to errors or biases in their decision making.133  This
is more common when people are faced with novel or complex tasks.134
These ideas are relevant to juror decision making, especially during
complex trials.  In these situations, much of the information jurors process
will be difficult and novel, and deliberation will be more arduous.  In these
challenging settings, there is a tendency for intuitions to prevail over delib-
erative thought; however, the deliberative system is capable of overriding
intuition.
The anticipation of having to provide reasons for their decisions could
be helpful if it induces jurors to engage with their deliberative system while
they consider and analyze trial evidence and testimony.  The unanswered
question is whether requiring reasoned verdicts produces more deliberative
System II thinking when compared to a situation in which jurors deliberate
130. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).  The
deliberative system is more controlled and can help us with novel tasks.  Some scholars
reject the “contrast between intuition and reasoning as if these were two quite different
forms of inference”; rather, they consider “reasoning itself is a kind of intuitive infer-
ence.” HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 7 (2017).
131. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 130.
132. Id. at 51– 52
133. Id. at 58– 59.  The intuitive system works quickly to produce answers.  We are
often confident in our intuitions because of the ease with which they come to mind.
System II may give way to System I, and we may begin to accept intuitions that come
easily to mind.
134. Id.
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when deciding a general verdict.  That is, do jurors benefit from the addi-
tional requirement of public reason-giving in support of a verdict when
they already engage in private reason-giving during jury discussions?
2. Story Model of Juror Decision Making
Most jury researchers consider the story model of juror decision mak-
ing to be the best account of the approach that jurors take in a system in
which a general verdict of guilty or not guilty is required.135  In systems
using general verdicts, jurors first listen to and interpret evidence for them-
selves and then develop their own narrative account or story of the case.136
As jurors construct their narratives, they search these stories for inconsis-
tencies, check for contradictions in evidence, and explore the fit of alterna-
tive stories.137  However, jurors might dismiss or underweight evidence
that does not fit the emerging story that they find most compelling.138
This approach to inconsistent evidence is in line with other psychological
tendencies.
Jurors then engage in group deliberation, armed with their own con-
struction of the story, which they must defend as they deliberate with other
jurors.139  In this discussion, jurors must reason with one another about
each story in order to determine which story is best.140  The deliberation
generally leads to acceptance of the most fitting story, which is the one that
most comprehensively accounts for the facts in the case.141
Some research on the story model suggests that there are benefits to
having jurors render general verdicts wherein they can structure their own
deliberations and decision making.  In a series of studies, Pennington and
Hastie explored how narrative construction impacted mock juror decision
making.  In one study, participants served as mock jurors and reviewed
135. Lora M. Levett & Dennis Devine, Integrating Individual and Group Models of Juror
Decision Making, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURIES 11, 13 (Margaret Bull Kovera ed., 2017)
(“The story model of juror decision making has been lauded as the most descriptively
accurate way to explain how jurors make decisions . . . .”); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P.
HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 135 (2007) (“Many subsequent studies . . . have lent
support to the basic assumptions of the story model . . . .”).
136. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 252 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington &
Hastie, Evidence Evaluation]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-based Deci-
sion Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521, 527 (1988) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie,
Explanation-based Decision Making]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the
Evidence: Test of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 189, 189– 90 (1992) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evi-
dence]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Mak-
ing, 49 COGNITION 123, 125– 26 (1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Reasoning].
137. See Pennington & Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making, supra
note 136, at 125– 26.
138. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 136.
139. See Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-based Decision Making, supra note 136, at
530– 31.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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case evidence presented either in story order or by issue.142  Participants
who were presented with evidence in story order showed evidence of
organizing the evidence in their memory in story order, while those who
were presented with evidence ordered by issue showed memory organiza-
tion along issue lines.  Further, when mock jurors were presented with evi-
dence in story order, and in turn, structured their memories in a narrative
fashion, they made decisions more faithful to the preponderance of the evi-
dence compared to when they were presented with evidence by legal
issue.143  When evidence was presented in story order as opposed to issue
order, participants also expressed more confidence in their decisions.144
Item-by-item judgments, which bear some similarity to reasoned verdicts,
special verdicts, and general verdicts with answers to written questions, led
to less explanation-based reasoning and lower confidence by participants
in their decisions.145  The story model research provides evidence that
allowing jurors to structure evidence in a narrative fashion might lead to
better decision making than the imposed legal issue order, which resem-
bles the question lists of reasoned verdicts.146
A concern raised by research on the story model is that jurors may
misremember and mischaracterize evidence in order to shoehorn it into
their story narrative.  Mock jurors’ recognition memory for evidence was
higher for items that supported their chosen verdict, and mock jurors
incorrectly remembered some case facts that fit well with their narratives,
even when that evidence was not actually provided.147
Overall, the story model research buttresses the arguments of support-
ers of general verdicts because it suggests that jurors already reason deeply
about trial evidence and case facts even without specific prompting.148
Jurors make complex inferences about evidence, reason in terms of nega-
tion through contradiction, reason through analogy, and discount other
alternatives.149  It seems that general verdicts with unstructured delibera-
tion imposes at least some requirements on jurors to engage in reasoning
with others.
3. Moral Reasoning
In a line of research relevant to reasoned verdicts, moral and cultural
psychologist Jonathan Haidt and colleagues argue that morality and politi-
cal ideology greatly affect our decisions in many contexts.  In contrast to
rational or deliberative models of moral judgments and decision making,
which suggest that moral reasoning is the basis of moral judgments, Haidt
and colleagues propose that moral reasoning occurs post hoc, once moral
142. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 136, at 194.
143. Id. at 195.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 202– 03.
146. See id.
147. Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-based Decision Making, supra note 136, at 526.
148. See generally Pennington & Hastie, Reasoning, supra note 136.
149. See id. at 155.
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judgments have already been made.150  This theory proposes that decision
making is greatly affected by social and cultural influences, which cause us
to have fast, automatic gut reactions in response to moral stimuli.151  Once
we assess our intuitions by taking stock and analyzing what we are feeling,
we form moral judgments. Haidt suggests that moral emotions such as
shame, disgust, contempt, and anger directly cause moral judgments.152
Afterwards, we engage in reasoning to explain, understand, and justify our
judgments.  As Haidt explains it, “one becomes a lawyer trying to build a
case rather than a judge searching for the truth.”153
In one illustrative study, Haidt and colleagues found that judgment
often precedes reasoning and that individuals often cannot support their
judgments with reasoning.154  Participants in this study read a series of
stories regarding moral issues and two “non-moral intuition” acts.155  In
the first story, individuals read about the “Heinz dilemma” in which a man
steals drugs from a pharmacy to save his dying wife’s life.156  Participants
then heard two stories detailing immoral acts, one about siblings engaging
in consensual incest, and one regarding a woman cooking and eating
human flesh from a cadaver in a research facility.157  After each story, par-
ticipants were asked if the depicted acts from the stories were wrong and
were asked to provide reasons to support their answers.158  The experi-
menter would then try to undermine the participants’ reasons.159  In many
situations, participants seemed to be unable to provide reasons for their
judgments and often reported that they were dumbfounded.160  Partici-
pants often made judgments based on intuitions and gut feelings, and typi-
150. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (And Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?,
6 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 517 (2002).
151. See id. at 517.
152. See generally Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between
Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community,
Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574 (1999).  Moral intuitions
occur quickly in response to moral stimuli and are often accompanied by moral emo-
tions.  New research utilizing neuroimaging also suggests a strong role of emotion in
moral judgments and decision making. See Greene, supra note 150, at 517.
153. Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 25, at 818.  Furthermore, Haidt argues that
in many cases we never even begin this reasoning process.  Haidt argues that this reason-
ing “is hypothesized to be rare, occurring primarily in cases in which the initial intuition
is weak and processing capacity is high.” Id. at 819.  Even when we do, Haidt argues
that we are extremely adept at searching for information to support our moral judg-
ments, and thus, our information searches are often biased in favor of supporting our
preexisting beliefs.  Haidt says that this gives us the “illusion of objective reasoning.”  Id.
at 822.
154. Jonathan Haidt, Fredrik Bjo¨rklund & Scott Murphy, Moral Dumbfounding:
When Intuition Finds No Reason 5 (Aug. 10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors) (citing Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmen-
tal Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH (D. A.
Goslin ed., 1969)).
155. See id. at 5– 6.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 6.
160. See id. at 7.
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cally could not provide reasons, or provided post hoc reasons, to support
their judgments.161
Haidt argues “people rarely override their initial intuitive judgments
just by reasoning privately to themselves because reasoning is rarely used
to question one’s own attitudes or beliefs.”162  He warns that generating
reasons post hoc may only give the illusion of objectivity.163  However,
Haidt acknowledges that intuitions can sometimes be overridden through
deliberative reasoning in which new intuitions are triggered through taking
different roles or perspectives.164
It is interesting to consider how Haidt’s research applies to the debate
over reasoned verdicts.  On the one hand, evidence that reasons for individ-
ual judgments are often generated post hoc leads us to doubt that the
requirement of reasoning will produce stronger juror fact finding.  On the
other hand, the jury experience requires that jurors explain the reasons for
their individual judgments to one another, and exposure to these different
perspectives in jury deliberation may allow individuals to overcome their
initial intuitions and engage in more robust decision making.  Then too, in
situations where the jurors are morally dumbfounded, the reasons they
provide to one another for their judgments might be flawed or inconsistent.
Jury deliberation, even without a reasoning requirement, could well expose
these weakly supported judgments.  Or, if a verdict is required to be rea-
soned, these weaknesses could be discovered during judicial review of their
161. See id. at 7– 8.  In a parallel context, Allen and Seniuk argue that judges’ reasons
about facts can often be false.  They state, “based on all the observations at trial, a view
of what happened begins to emerge in the mind of the fact finder and it is the emergence
of this overall sense of what transpired that in turn generates subsequently conclusions
that this or that witness’ story is consistent or inconsistent with the truth.”  Ronald J.
Allen & Gerald T. G. Seniuk, Two Puzzles of Juridical Proof, 76 CAN. B. REV. 65, 76
(1997).  Allen and Seniuk also indicate that biases or corruption in decision making are
likely hidden from the reasons provided. Id. at 78.  However, Menashe argues that a
reasoning requirement for judges would, at a minimum, “rein in the judge’s intuitive
impressions, which may be swayed by various biases, errors or stereotypes.”  Menashe,
supra note 111, at 239. R
162. Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 25, at 819.  Other research supports the
notion that moral emotions lead to intuitive rather than reasoned responses, and that
some emotions are less likely to evoke justification and elaborated reasoning than
others. See generally Pascale S. Russell & Roger Giner-Sorolla, Social Justifications for
Moral Emotions: When Reasons for Disgust Are Less Elaborated than for Anger, 11 EMOTION
637 (2011).  In three experiments, Russell and colleagues found that participants were
more likely to give elaborated reasoning to explain anger versus disgust in response to
immoral actions and sexual or nonsexual norms. Id. Participants had great difficulty
accessing and elaborating on reasons to explain bodily disgust, but not anger. Id. This
work suggests that certain moral emotions occur intuitively in response to certain situa-
tions, and that judgments about them are not founded on elaborated reasons. Id.
163. Allen and Seniuk also argue that, for judges, the reasons they have for believing
one witness over another “will be as complex and impenetrable as the sum of the judge’s
background and knowledge that he brought to the trial before it began.  Once belief has
settled, then the conclusion becomes obvious that those championing another version
are wrong and not to be believed.  But this is not something that can be known in
advance; it emerges as beliefs about the case as a whole emerge as the evidence and
arguments unfold.”  Allen & Seniuk, supra note 161, at 76.
164. See Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 25, at 819.
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judgments and reasoning.  If so, a judge could return the verdict for correc-
tion or the jury’s decision could be overturned.165
4. Predecisional Distortion and Motivated Reasoning
Two psychological phenomena— predecisional distortion and the
allied concept of motivated reasoning— are relevant to the debate on rea-
soned verdicts.  In predecisional distortion, individuals tend to interpret or
even distort new information to cohere with their already established pref-
erences.166  The tendency is most pronounced when information is ambig-
uous and capable of multiple interpretations.167  J. Edward Russo and his
colleagues explored the possibility of predecisional distortion in jurors’
interpretations of evidence.  In two experiments simulating civil and crimi-
nal trials, Russo found that mock jurors distorted mock trial evidence in
support of the leading verdict despite warnings and judicial instructions
not to do so.168  Jurors distorted incoming information so that new infor-
mation was coherent with their existing beliefs.169  The tendency to distort
information was greater when mock jurors were more confident in the lead-
ing verdict.170
The phenomenon of predecisional distortion has implications for the
requirement of reasoned verdicts.  Requiring reasons of jurors is supposed
to promote juror rationality, yet it might not actually do so if jurors form
their judgments of the case before they draft the reasons underlying their
165. MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, supra note 130, at 262– 73 (describing the value of
group deliberation on decision quality); email from Zachary Clopton, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Cornell Law School, to Kayla A. Burd, Human Development, Cornell Univer-
sity & Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Sept. 2, 2016) (on file
with authors).
166. J. Edward Russo, Margaret G. Meloy & Victoria Husted Medvec, Predecisional
Distortion of Product Information, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 438, 445 (1998) [hereinafter
Russo et al., Predecisional Distortion]. Russo and colleagues found that predecisional
distortion can occur even when individuals are not asked to make a choice.  Such distor-
tion may be even greater in ambiguous or equivocal situations.  When information that
was roughly equivalent was given to participants, one attribute at a time, the evaluation
of this information was distorted to support a preferred choice.  Id. at 438.  However,
participants were less likely to distort incoming information when the new information
favored one option, as there was less room for subjective interpretation of the informa-
tion. Id. at 448.
167. J. Edward Russo, Victoria Husted Medvec & Maragaret G. Meloy, The Distortion
of Information During Decisions, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 102
(1996) [hereinafter Russo et al., The Distortion of Information].  Russo and his colleagues
explored the impact of preexisting preferences on the processing of new information
and found that preexisting or even developing preferences for an option led to the distor-
tion of incoming information such that the new information was perceived as favoring
the leading choice.  Thus, preexisting preferences led individuals to process and evaluate
new information in biased ways. Id. at 106.  In addition, cognitive dissonance may
affect perceptions of a judgment that has been made.  Individuals often distort informa-
tion so that it favors a preexisting decision in order to reduce discomfort with the deci-
sion. Id. at 102.
168. Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock
Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 91 (2001).
169. Id. at 99.
170. Id. at 95– 96.
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verdict.  Like Haidt’s work on moral reasoning, predecisional distortion
research suggests that the reasons provided may simply be post hoc justifi-
cations for preexisting judgments.  In this way, rather than deliberating
deeply about the reasons for a verdict, jurors may create justifications and
find reasons to support the decisions they have already reached.  In sum,
the verdict drives the reasons; the reasons do not drive the verdict.  How-
ever, strong, unambiguous cases leave less room for distorted interpreta-
tion of information.
The phenomenon of motivated reasoning, or the tendency to evaluate
information with a goal or end in mind, bears some resemblance to
predecisional distortion.171  Motivated reasoning can shift individuals’ per-
ceptions of facts and evidence.  Research conducted by Avani Sood demon-
strates that participants acting as judges engaged in motivated cognition
during the evaluation of heinous crimes.172  When participants were faced
with important but illegally obtained evidence, they interpreted how the
evidence was obtained in a way that allowed for an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.173  When participants thought the commission of a serious
crime needed to be punished, they accepted the evidence even when it was
obtained illegally.174  Triers of fact perceive evidence (and even laws) dif-
ferently depending on their view of what the correct outcome should be.175
Paradoxically, thinking and reflecting deeply may make individuals more
likely to engage in motivated reasoning based on preexisting ideologies.
Both liberals and conservatives are equally likely to engage in motivated
reasoning, even when predisposed to reason deeply.176
5. Related Jury Research
Applying these psychological theories to the debate over reasoned ver-
dicts provides several insights about how requiring reasons might affect the
accuracy of jury decision making.  With this as useful theoretical back-
ground, it is also important to examine the extensive body of research on
the accuracy and quality of jury decision making.
The aforementioned research reinforces the general soundness of jury
verdicts.  In the U.S., judges agree with the substantial majority of jury ver-
171. Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 JUDG-
MENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013) (citing Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)).
172. See generally Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology
and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L.J. 1543, 1543 (2015).
173. Id.
174. Id.  Other research by Sood suggests that participants rely on motivated cogni-
tion when they believe that someone has caused harm.  When participants were told
that the law required a finding of harm for penalty, they were more likely to interpret
non-harmful acts as harmful.  Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of
Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: Legal Implications of Outcome-Driven Reasoning,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1332 (2012).
175. See Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments— An Analytic
Review, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 308 (2013).
176. Id. at 314; Kahan, supra note 171, at 407.
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dicts in criminal and civil trials over which they preside.177  The strength
of the evidence in a case is the single most significant determinant of jury
verdicts, whether evidence strength is measured from the jurors’ or the pre-
siding judge’s perspective.178  To be sure, juries encounter fact-finding
challenges, especially in complex cases.179  Would requiring them to pro-
vide reasons and insisting that they answer a series of specific questions
about their fact finding improve their decision making?
Research using mock jury deliberations provides us with some
insights about whether deliberation functions as the reason-giving engine
that is claimed by supporters of general verdicts.  In one such study,
Phoebe Ellsworth analyzed the complexity, depth, and accuracy of juror
reasoning during mock jury deliberations.180  She found that jurors typi-
cally discussed factual information coupled with inferences about the
information, referenced the law in their discussions, and generally resolved
questions about case facts accurately.181  When some jurors made errors
in factual claims during jury deliberation, other jurors usually corrected
the errors.182
Of course, the deliberation process by which jurors arrive at general
verdicts can be less than optimal.  Due in part to an effort to protect the
jury’s independence, judges usually give no directions— or give only very
general instructions— to jurors about how to manage their deliberation.183
177. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55– 65 (1966);
Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G.
Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in
Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 182– 83 (2005) (showing substantial judicial agreement with jury
verdicts); Paula L. Hannaford, B. Michael Dann & G. Thomas Munsterman, How Judges
View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 248– 49 (1998) (finding that trial judges
strongly support the jury system and believe jurors to be competent); Valerie P. Hans,
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Hung Jury: THE
AMERICAN JURY’S Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33 (2003)
(showing substantial judicial agreement with jury verdicts).  Research by Vidmar regard-
ing civil cases suggests that jurors and legal professionals (senior lawyers and former
judges) gave damage awards that were similar in terms of the mean and median awards.
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 884 (1998).  Further, Vidmar found no evidence that jurors decided
on negligence less competently than judges, and in fact, he concluded that jurors’ com-
bined judgments might be superior to those made by a single judge.
178. Eisenberg et al., supra note 177, at 196– 97.
179. See generally Valerie P. Hans & Michael J. Saks, Improving Judge and Jury Evalua-
tion of Scientific Evidence, DAEDALUS (forthcoming) (describing fact-finding challenges in
cases with scientific and complex evidence) (on file with authors).
180. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217– 20 (1989). See also Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Citizens as
Legal Decision Makers: An International Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 303, 307– 08
(2007) (describing how group decision-making promotes sound jury verdicts).
181. Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 217– 19.
182. Id. at 217.
183. See, e.g., a set of guidelines that Wisconsin judges adapted from a document
originally developed by the American Judicature Society.  Wisconsin Chief Judges’ Sub-
committee on Juror Treatment and Selection, Behind Closed Doors: A Guide for Jury
Deliberation, http://athensdesantis.com/downloads/criminal_law/0_jury_deliberation
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KK3-X4S9].
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Jurors may fail to discuss important issues, especially if such issues pertain
to a verdict that no juror or perhaps only one juror supports.184  Delibera-
tion may quickly turn into a “verdict-driven” discussion in which jurors
identify evidence that favors their preferred verdicts, rather than a more
“evidence-driven” discussion in which jurors initially engage in general
analysis of the trial evidence and only later debate the appropriate
verdict.185
Another challenge is competent interpretation of the law.  Jurors turn
to the law and legal definitions for verdicts in order to guide their discus-
sions, and research on jury deliberations shows that jurors typically spend
a great deal of time trying to understand and apply the law.186  Nonethe-
less, juries sometimes struggle with the precise meaning of legal terms and
how to apply the law to the facts of the case.187  Ellsworth’s study found
that even though jury deliberation corrected most factual errors, jurors’
misstatements of the law during jury deliberation were not usually
corrected.188
In one of the only experimental studies comparing special verdicts
and general verdicts, Elizabeth Wiggins and Steven Breckler presented
mock jurors with a videotape of a mock civil trial.189  The defamation case
presented, Hennessey v. Morgan, had roughly balanced evidence for the
defendant and plaintiff.  Wiggins and Breckler asked half of the partici-
pants to render a general verdict, and asked the other half to give a special
verdict.190  In addition to obtaining participants’ general or special ver-
dicts, the researchers measured mock jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s,
184. Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 218.
185. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 163
(1983) (differentiating evidence-driven and verdict-driven deliberations); Hannaford et
al., supra note 177, at 35 (finding that verdict-driven deliberations are more likely to R
result in hung juries than evidence-driven deliberations).
186. Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 218.
187. For a contemporary example, see Graham Bowley & Sophie Wodzak, What
Divided the Cosby Jurors? Words, For One Thing, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/arts/television/bill-cosby-jurors-mistrial-wording-
unconscious.html [https://perma.cc/C7JG-CS2E] (reporting that jurors in Cosby’s first
trial, which resulted in a hung jury, disagreed about how to interpret legal instructions).
188. Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 218. See also Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans & Eliza-
beth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 749 (1991) (“[I]f the jury had an Achilles heel, it is the compre-
hension of legal instructions.”); Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose,
The Kettleful of Law in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1565– 66, 1598 (2012) (finding that jurors had special difficulty
with figuring out how multiple legal instructions fit together.  A road map, along with
pattern jury instructions that are rewritten with clearer language and tighter organiza-
tion, increases juror comprehension of the law substantially.).
189. Wiggins, supra note 98, at 36– 37; Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 1.
190. Id. This study was limited in that it did not utilize mock juror deliberation.  This
study may not indicate how a jury would respond to special verdicts, but rather how
individual mock jurors, without deliberation, would respond.  Email from Nancy S.
Marder, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to Kayla A. Burd, Human Devel-
opment, Cornell University & Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
(Oct. 16, 2016) (on file with authors).
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defendant’s, and witnesses’ comprehension of the judicial instructions and
confidence in the decision.
Interestingly, the format of the verdict did not lead to differences in
individual mock jurors’ verdict decisions or the total amount of the damage
awards.191  However, differences in the verdict format affected the propor-
tion of compensatory and punitive damages awarded.  Participants in the
special verdict condition awarded proportionally more compensatory dam-
age awards than those in the general verdict condition, while punitive dam-
ages did not differ across groups.192  In addition, participants who were
asked for a special verdict showed better comprehension of the legal
instructions on the burden of proof, compared to participants who were
asked only to provide a general verdict.193
Regardless of which verdict form participants utilized, jurors’ percep-
tions of the parties were strongly related to their chosen verdict.  Wiggins
and Breckler concluded that the mock jurors made decisions based on
their overall impressions of the case, especially their impressions of the
plaintiff and defendant, even when directed to complete a special verdict
form.194  Wiggins and Breckler also discovered that participants who gave
a special verdict were less confident than those who gave a general
verdict.195
One other project, a study of actual criminal and civil jury trials, sheds
some light on how jurors react to guidance provided by judges through
verdict forms.  Steven Penrod and Larry Heuer gave questionnaires to
judges and juries in 160 criminal or civil cases, and analyzed the relation-
ship between various trial procedures and juror reactions.196  The
researchers asked judges which trial procedures had been employed in
their cases, including notetaking, asking questions, and verdict forms.197
Jurors who had received verdict forms to record the jury’s responses to
their verdicts (and any associated questions) felt more informed and more
satisfied that they had reached the correct verdict, compared to those who
had been in trials in which the judge had not given them a special form.198
Jurors in cases with verdict forms also expressed more confidence that they
had understood the judicial instructions.199  The study did not experimen-
tally vary whether jurors received verdict forms or not, so it is possible that
other differences in the cases or the judges led to the observed greater posi-
tivity among the jurors.  The authors did not report the content of the ver-
191. Wiggins, supra note 98, at 1; Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 30.
192. Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 30.
193. Id. at 31.
194. Id. at 32; Allen & Seniuk, supra note 161, at 77 (“[A]t the end of the trial, the
grounds for believing or disbelieving are a sum of the interaction of all the observations
at trial with all the knowledge brought to the case by the fact finder.  This cannot be
reduced either to rules or to straight forward explanation.”).
195. Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 30.
196. Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29 (1994).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 50.
199. Id.
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dict forms, but the overall results suggest that receiving written guidance
relating to verdicts may provide reassurance to jurors in some cases.
Whether this guidance is done most effectively through verdict forms or
through written copies of the judicial instructions is an open question.
6. Summary
The rationales for special verdicts, and for general verdicts with
answers to questions, overlap with the impetus for reasoned verdicts— to
serve as a check on jury decision making and thereby promote sound and
accurate jury fact finding.  The exact structure and operationalization of
these options differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  However, the
options share some commonalities.  They all attempt to guide the jury’s
decision process by posing questions, asking jurors to reflect on the factual
basis for their responses, and directing the jurors’ attention to issues in a
particular sequence.
Considering that each of these options encourages or requires reason-
giving, the psychological research on reasoning and reason-giving raises
significant questions about how such a requirement affects the accuracy
and soundness of jury decision making.  Reason-based choice analysis
explores how individuals make decisions when they must choose among
alternatives in times of doubt, uncertainty, or conflict.  This approach
“explains choice in terms of the balance of reasons for and against the vari-
ous alternatives.”200  Eldar Shafir and colleagues explain:
Unfortunately, the actual reasons that guide decisions may or may not corre-
spond to those reported by the subjects . . . .  [S]ubjects are sometimes una-
ware of the precise factors that determine their choices, and generate
spurious explanations when asked to account for their decisions.201
The research indicates that we often justify decisions that we have already
made.202  The empirical data on the effects of special versus general ver-
dicts are limited, and the results are mixed.203  Further, in a parallel con-
text, Ronald Allen and Gerald Seniuk argue:
Reasons are integral to rational judgment, and the call for reasons seems
tantamount to the call for rationality.  Yet the human condition impinges.
200. Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNI-
TION 11, 12 (1993).
201. Id. at 13.
202. People sometimes make decisions that are “easy to explain and justify.”  Id. at
14.  However, this does not ensure that we always make rational choices, and such
choices may at times be based on affective judgments without “a thorough evaluation of
the options.”  Id. at 32.  Shafir and colleagues explain that, “when faced with the need to
choose, decision makers often seek and construct reasons in order to resolve the conflict
and justify their choice, to themselves and to others.”  Id. at 11.  Thus, jurors may assign
reasons post hoc instead of reasoning first and making judgments later.  Objective rea-
soning may be particularly difficult in long, complex, ambiguous, and/or morally
charged cases, and requiring reasons of jurors may not successfully mitigate such diffi-
culties.  Here, requiring reasons may not harm decisions, but it may not ensure that
reasoning occurs before decision making.
203. Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 2– 22.
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The factors upon which rational judgment operate can defy the very call for
reasons that is designed to guarantee that it is indeed rational judgment that
is operating . . . [judges] will . . . find themselves unable to identify even to
themselves the reasons that satisfactorily explain why they believe one wit-
ness or disbelieve another.204
In sum, empirical research and experience suggest that general, spe-
cial, and reasoned verdicts have some potential strengths and weaknesses.
However, we are unaware of any empirical work that has compared these
three alternatives, so we cannot be sure which of the above stimulates the
strongest decision-making processes in jurors and produces the most accu-
rate verdicts.  The idea that a reasoned jury verdict will be a higher quality
jury verdict is intuitively attractive.  But we do not yet have evidence to
support this intuition, and the psychological research raises questions
about the value of requiring reasons beyond those already part of the jury
process.
B. Jury Independence and Jury Transparency
Although the soundness and accuracy of jury decision processes and
verdicts are key goals of those who favor reasoned and structured verdicts,
two other lines of argument have emerged.  One argument surrounds the
independence of the jury as a fact finder and how a reasoning requirement
might affect that independence.  The other argument focuses on how the
transparency of jury decision making, or the lack of it, might affect the
legitimacy of the verdict.  We will take up each of these in turn.
1. Jury Independence and Judicial Control: The Role of Framing
The jury is a fact finder, but also a political body.205  As the Court
wrote in Duncan v. Louisiana: “Providing an accused with the right to be
tried by a jury of his peers [gives the accused] an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.”206  Procedures in most classic jury systems
protect jury independence by ensuring the privacy of deliberation and
shielding the jury from outside influence.  One critically important issue
in the reasoned verdicts debate is how, if at all, requiring reasons or struc-
turing jury decision making might affect the political role and indepen-
dence of the jury.
Abramson asserts that much of the power of the jury lies in the free
deliberative process that occurs outside the presence of the trial judge.207
Abramson argues “the jury is an example of deliberation where impartial-
ity and independence are enhanced by closing the jury room doors.”208
General verdicts with free deliberation protect jurors from undue external
204. Allen & Seniuk, supra note 161, at 77.
205. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
206. Id.
207. Abramson, supra note 112, at 876. R
208. Id.
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influences and allow for greater freedom in decision making.209  Jurors can
resist political pressures and can acquit defendants without explanation
“with the exercise of [their] ‘inner conviction.’”210  The privacy of general
verdicts offers independence to jurors and allows them to reach unpopular
decisions.  Jurors are protected from what outsiders might think of their
opinions and judgments.  As a result, general verdicts, these scholars argue,
ensure jury independence in decision making.211  As Justice Alito, dissent-
ing in Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, observed: “The jury trial right protects
parties in court cases from being judged by a special class of trained pro-
fessionals who do not speak the language of ordinary people and may not
understand or appreciate the way ordinary people live their lives.  To pro-
tect that right, the door to the jury room has been locked, and the confiden-
tiality of jury deliberations has been closely guarded.”212
Trial judges have a great deal of power in traditional jury trials.213
They preside over all aspects of the trial, starting with jury selection in
which they, aided by the lawyers, determine the suitability of jurors for
trial.214  Judges decide procedural and other legal issues, determining
what evidence the jury may hear.215  In addition, in some jurisdictions
judges can comment on the evidence.216  Finally, judges instruct jurors in
the law, educating jurors on how to apply the legal principles to case
facts.217
The use of reasoned verdicts, jury responses to questions posed by the
court, and special verdicts will increase the already substantial control that
judges have over the jury.  Of course, some may see this as a positive, and
not negative, particularly if there is little trust in the ability of the jury to
decide cases fairly and accurately.218
Special verdicts also weaken the power of juries by granting them less
latitude in decision making.219  Special verdicts limit the jury’s ability to
“bring its own sense of justice, rightness, or equity to its decision.”220  In
addition to lessening the jury’s latitude and power, at least one scholar
209. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 186. R
210. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 619. R
211. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 186.
212. 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
213. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 147 (describing the extensive role of judges R
who preside over jury trials).
214. Judges can remove prospective jurors for cause, and lawyers can remove jurors
through peremptory challenges. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 47; FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
215. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 147 (describing the extensive role of judges R
who preside over jury trials).
216. Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury,
in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 42 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) (“[I]n all countries except the
United States and Scotland judges have the positive duty to not only instruct the jury on
the applicable law but to also impartially review the trial evidence.”).
217. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 631– 32. R
218. Marder & Hans, supra note 6, at 795. R
219. Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1348 (1996)
(citing Amendments to Rules of Civ. Pro. for the U.S. Dist. Cts., 374 U.S. 861, 868
(1963)).
220. Casper, supra note 98, at 440.
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surmises that special verdicts might increase hung juries; by requiring
jurors to agree on multiple factors in the special verdict questions, disagree-
ment on such points may be more likely, which may in turn lead to costly
mistrials.221
The historic case of United States v. Spock offers an instructive example
of how requiring responses to specific questions allows the judge greater
ability to shape the jury’s decision-making process and influence the out-
come.222  During the Vietnam War, the well-respected pediatrician Dr. Ben-
jamin Spock was charged with aiding young men in evading the draft.223
At his trial, jurors were asked not only to render a general verdict but also
to answer specific questions posed by the judge.224  The defense argued
that the special questions interfered with the jurors’ ability to deliberate
freely about the evidence and to come to a general verdict.225  In fact, post-
trial interviews with the jurors confirmed that the judicial instructions and
special questions had a strong effect on their decision making.226  As one
juror said, “I knew they were guilty when we were charged by the judge.  I
did not know prior to that time— I was in full agreement with the defend-
ants until we were charged by the judge.  That was the kiss of death.”227
During the appeal, the court indicated its reservation about the use of such
questions, mentioning that the questions could deeply influence jurors’
decisions, and ultimately its verdict: “There is no easier way to reach, and
perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step.”228
Would requiring reasons lessen the likelihood of jury nullification—
the practice whereby juries reach a verdict that is inconsistent with the law
and the facts because they view the alternative as unjust?  The practice is
controversial,229 but some see it as an essential part of the political role of
the jury.  Supporters of jury nullification might point to historic instances
in which juries bravely acquitted defendants unjustly targeted by the state,
221. Wright, supra note 90, at 418, 447. R
222. 416 F.2d 165, 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
223. Id. at 168.
224. Id.; Valerie P. Hans, El Veredicto General del Jurado [The General Verdict of the
Jury]: United States vs. Spock, 416 F. 2d 165 (1969), in EL JUICIO POR JURADOS EN LA
JURISPRUDENCIA NACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL SENTENCIAS COMENTADAS Y OPINIONES
ACADE´MICAS DEL COMMON LAW, DEL CIVIL LAW Y DE LA CORTE EUROPEA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS (A. M. Binder & Andre´s Harfuch eds., 2016) (English version on file with
authors).
225. Spock, 416 F.2d at 180– 81.
226. Hans, El Veredicto General del Jurado, supra note 224 (citing JESSICA MITFORD, THE
TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK 232 (1969)).
227. Id.
228. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182.
229. See, e.g., Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A
Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1249, 1249 (2003); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 155 (1986).
For an interesting perspective, see also Sherry F. Colb, A More Civilized Sort of Jury Nulli-
fication, DORF ON LAW, (May 24, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/05/a-more-civ
ilized-sort-of-jury.html [https://perma.cc/NDD6-5S3G] (advocating that jurors give rea-
sons for their acquittals, making the process “more transparent and more rule-like.”);
Caisa E. Royer, Note, Legislative Intent and Failed Attempts: Why Lawmakers Should Cod-
ify Jury Nullification, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1401, 1408– 10, 1424 (2017).
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such as abolitionists who violated the Fugitive Slave Laws in the 1800s.230
Others identify darker examples of jury nullification, such as Southern
juries that refused to convict those who violated civil rights laws.231  By all
accounts, outright jury nullification, in which juries knowingly go against
the law and the facts to reach an unsupportable verdict, is exceedingly
rare.232  Likely more common are cases in which juries take a generous
view of the law or the facts to achieve a verdict they believe is just; such an
approach can be facilitated by some of the psychological phenomena like
predecisional distortion and motivated reasoning that we discussed ear-
lier.233  Whether requiring reasons might disrupt one or both forms of jury
nullification remains an open question.
The psychological research on framing shows one mechanism by
which reason-giving, special verdicts, and general verdicts with answers to
written questions enhance judicial control over the jury’s decision-making
process.234  In the classic judgment and decision-making literature, fram-
ing occurs when people react differently to an event or outcome depending
on how it is presented; thus, events or outcomes can be objectively
equivalent, but we may interpret their meaning differently because of how
they are framed.235  For example, the outcome of a sporting event can be
framed as a win or a loss.  One can say that a team won a match, or one
can say that the other team lost the match.  These are objectively
equivalent, but the subjective perceptions of losses and wins are very differ-
ent.236  Much of the variance between the subjective meaning of different
frames comes from the emotional impact of the frames on our
intuitions.237
The way in which verdict sheets are written, or framed, is likely to have
significant implications for the ways in which jurors process associated
information.  Granholm and colleagues argue that special verdicts “are yet
another insidious device which endangers fair trial results by rigidly defin-
ing and contouring the issues.”238  The wording of the verdict forms may
be very significant, as “[l]anguage confines and molds ideas.”239
The framing literature pertains to juror reasoning in reasoned or spe-
cial verdicts, because the way that questions are posed or framed for the
230. See, e.g., STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGI-
TIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850– 1860 156– 57 (1968).
231. See Michal R. Belkap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 HOW. L.J. 467,
472– 74, 476 (1982).
232. Hannaford & Hans, supra note 229, at 1276. R
233. See Carlson & Russo, supra note 168, at 96, 99; Sood, Motivated Cognition, supra
note 175, at 317.
234. Casper, supra note 100, at 440. See also Granholm & Richards, supra note 98, at
531.
235. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Evalua-
tion of Prospects, 114 STUD. IN LOGIC & FOUND. OF MATHEMATICS 503, 504, 517– 19
(1986).
236. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 363 (2011).
237. Id.
238. Granholm & Richards, supra note 100, at 531.
239. Id. at 532.
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jury is likely to shape the jurors’ responses.  Jurors may interpret objective
equivalents differently, and framing verdict sheets in specific ways is very
likely to influence jurors.  One of the ideas behind reasoned verdicts is that
they will require jurors to pay closer attention to the details and evidence of
a case and will help them to make rational and carefully considered deci-
sions.  However, the sequencing of questions and/or improper or confus-
ing wording can change the framing of the issues and may have
unanticipated consequences on juror decision making.
In contrast, a general verdict allows jurors to structure their decision
making without the influence of framing effects from external sources.
Although other procedures and information presented may frame the
issues for jurors (e.g., closing arguments, jury instructions), those do so
more indirectly than special question lists.  This additional level of framing
undermines jurors’ freedom to deliberate in an unstructured way.240  It has
implications for verdict accuracy as well.  As we have discussed, the general
assumption is that question lists will enhance verdict accuracy.  However,
poorly constructed questions may harm juror reasoning by subjectively
guiding their decision-making processes while undermining their indepen-
dence.  What is more, repetitive questioning or the use of compound ques-
tions may lead to inconsistencies in verdicts.241
Research on the story model242 also suggests the power of framing,
even with a general verdict.243  That research showed that the order in
which evidence was presented affected jurors’ views about the strength of
the evidence and the persuasiveness of a story.244  In one study, partici-
pants were more than twice as likely to convict a defendant when the prose-
cution’s evidence flowed like a narrative or story.245  This provides some
support for the view that the ordering of questions on verdict forms mat-
ters and is likely to affect jurors’ verdicts.246
Like special verdicts, reasoned verdicts undermine the independence
of jurors and juries.  Because judges and sometimes the court clerk review
verdicts, juries using reasoned verdicts cannot make independent judg-
ments in secret.247  This undercuts their power and autonomy, making nul-
lification improbable.  In one illustrative case in Spain, jurors acquitted a
defendant of aggravated murder, but the acquittal was overturned because
the trial judge claimed that the jury had submitted inadequate reason-
ing.248  This lack of independence may make juries more susceptible to
240. Wiggins, supra note 98, at 27– 28.
241. Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 126, at 4, 7.
242. See generally Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 136. R
243. See id. at 202.
244. Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-based Decision Making, supra note 136, at 530.
245. Id. at 529– 30.
246. See Casper, supra note 98, at 44 (noting that “the ways in which verdicts are
structured may affect jury decisions.”).
247. See Stephen C. Thaman, Ensuring the Factual Reliability of Criminal Convictions:
Reasoned Judgments or a Return to Formal Rules of Evidence, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 97 (Jacqueline Ross & Steven Thaman, eds., 2016) [hereinafter Thaman,
Ensuring Factual Reliability].
248. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 656. R
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judicial influences as judges are permitted to overturn verdicts that they
believe are based on insufficient reasoning.249  In theory, this means that
judges have the power to substitute their judgment for that of the jury.
In Italy, lay judges play a lesser role in the deliberation process than
the professional judge.250  The reasoning requirement makes lay participa-
tion difficult, as lay judges do not have experience discussing the law.251
Some professional judges argue that requiring reasons of lay judges “elimi-
nates the credibility of the laypeople’s presence in a criminal court.”252  In
Spain, court clerks are often called on to help jurors articulate their reasons
in ways that conform to the laws, and sometimes jurors find that their justi-
fications do not mesh well with the legal framework and thus must be
rejected.253  The Spanish Constitutional Court has ruled that judges have
no duty to return verdicts to jurors in order to correct insufficiencies in
reasoning.254  Thus, tension exists between the maintenance of jury inde-
pendence and the procedural requirements of reasoned verdicts.  Verdict
forms give judges additional power while taking away the freedom of deci-
sion making from jurors.
The courts already have considerable control over juries through the
use of judicial instructions, evidence decisions, and more.  General ver-
dicts, therefore, are arguably simpler compared to other verdict options.
Additionally, one can track the logic of the verdicts by analyzing the evi-
dentiary record and judicial instructions.255  In Taxquet, the Grand Cham-
ber discussed several “sufficient safeguards” which might be used in place
of reasoned verdicts.256  In cases in which jurors are not required to give
reasons, “directions or guidance” from the judge and “precise, unequivocal
questions” might suffice to replace extensive reasoning.257
Jimeno-Bulnes writes, “A quintessential element of the classic Anglo-
Saxon jury system is precisely the absence of any kind of explanation; the
verdict is by nature spontaneous.”258  Criminal juries are thought to reflect
the “conscience of the community” and thus possess “inherent legiti-
macy.”259  The verdict is thought to reflect the truth and therefore requires
249. See Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 192 (noting that in Italy, the joint delibera-
tion process between the lay and professional judges can also be difficult at times); Id. at
196– 99 (noting that professional and lay judges reportedly agree that professional
judges have more power and impact over the deliberation and decision-making
processes than do the lay judge).
250. Id. at 196.
251. Id. at 199.
252. Id.
253. See Jimeno-Bulnes & Hans, Legal Interpreter for the Jury, supra note 6, at R
202– 03.
254. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 650.
255. See Lempert, supra note 114, at 487– 88.  Lempert argues that jurors’ reasons are
already clear: If jurors acquit, it indicates that the burden of proof has not been met,
whereas if they convict, it means the prosecutor has met this burden. Thus, additional
reasons are unnecessary.
256. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 625. R
257. Id.
258. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 769.
259. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 613. R
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no justification or explanation.260  Several jurisdictions once supported
classic juries and classic jury procedures.  For instance, judges in Spain,
like in France, were allowed to “appreciate the evidence admitted at trial
according to their conscience”261 and courts in Germany allowed fact-find-
ers to make decisions on the basis of “free conviction derived from the
content of the trial.”262  Ultimately, if judges require jurors to give reasons
for their verdicts which the judge must accept as legitimate, such jurors are
not as free to reflect the conscience of the community.
2. Transparency and Legitimacy of Jury Verdicts
Justifications for reasoned and special verdicts often include their sup-
posed benefits for greater transparency, more effective appellate review,
and enhanced legitimacy.263  Scholars who discuss the potential benefits
of reasoned verdicts maintain that requiring reasons helps defendants and
the courts understand jurors’ verdicts, a key justification in the Taxquet
case discussed earlier.264  One of the most compelling arguments made in
favor of reasoned verdicts is the ability for judges to review the basis for the
jury’s decision making.  Thus, reasoned verdicts could help to ensure more
effective appellate review.265  For example, in one Spanish case, a woman
was convicted of murder, but the judgment was overturned due to the judi-
cial assessment that there were insufficiencies in the jurors’ reasoning.266
Analyzing the case, Thaman concluded that a directed verdict should have
been entered to acquit the defendant.267  Even without that, however, the
review of the jury’s reasons revealed their inadequacy and the conviction
was overturned.268
Generally, jurors’ reasons can be reviewed to “isolate correct and
260. Id.
261. Id. at 632.
262. Id.
263. Id.  See, e.g., Menashe, supra note 111, at 229– 30.  Menashe argues that a reason-
ing requirement for judges aids in transparency and appellate review. Further, the rea-
soning requirement for judges may “encourage[] judges to make well-founded
decisions.” Id. at 230. See also Allen & Seniuk, supra note 161, at 76 (indicating that
proponents of the reasoning requirement believe that the requirement will aid appellate
courts in the review of trial judges’ fact finding, including their beliefs about witnesses).
264. Thaman, Ensuring Factual Reliability, supra note 247, at 82.
265. Michael Csere, Reasoned Criminal Verdicts in the Netherlands and Spain: Implica-
tions for Juries in the United States, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 416 (2013). See also Thaman,
The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620– 21 (arguing that reasoned verdicts might R
“minimize the amount of completely innocent persons who have been sentenced to
death or other long prison sentences based on flawed evidence.”). See also Thaman,
Ensuring the Factual Reliability, supra note 247, at 92 (stating that in the U.S. context,
appellate courts have access to full transcripts of the trial that they can review to evalu-
ate a claim of evidentiary insufficiency); Id. at 99 (noting that Thaman does not call for
jurors to give reasons for acquittals); Id. at 108 (noting that higher courts have on occa-
sion overturned convictions based on “unconvincing judgment reason”).
266. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 639– 42. R
267. Id. at 645.
268. Id. at 660.
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incorrect outcomes at the trial level.”269  In France’s mixed court, the ques-
tions posed to the court can be seen as complementing the free evaluation
of evidence.  The responses allow professional judges to understand the
logic of how lay jurors decide cases.270  Seeing the logic of jurors’ verdicts
enables judges to draft the written portions of judgments based, impor-
tantly, on the factual responses of jurors.271  Asking specific questions of
jurors and requiring answers and reasons for these answers would greatly
contribute to the reviewability of such judgments and could be helpful on
appeal.
Appellate courts can use jurors’ reasons potentially to “pin-point” and
“correct” error.272  Furthermore, defendants may in theory review these
reasons and could refer to them on appeal.273  One former federal judge
has added to the debate by making the controversial recommendation to
videotape jurors’ deliberations as a way to increase transparency— even if
juries continue to deliver only general verdicts.274
But whether judicial review can play this positive role depends in large
measure on getting the “real” reasons from the jurors.  The psychological
research on post hoc reasoning and on the impact of narratives, predeci-
sional distortion, and framing leads us to be cautious about assuming that
the reasons provided by the jury are the actual underpinnings and determi-
nants of the jury’s decision.  There is a good chance that the reasons may
have been generated post hoc and affected by framing and sequencing.
Transparency may be linked to legitimacy.  Writing about the fact that
professional judges must provide reasons for their judgments, Doron
Menashe observes that “[t]he right to appeal judicial decisions in one of
great importance, for this right reinforces the foundations of fairness and
reasonableness of the judicial procedure. . . . [T]he right to appeal is worth-
less if the appellate court cannot examine the considerations and reasoning
of the trial court.”275  General verdicts hide the decision-making process of
jurors, and this lack of transparency could undermine society’s confidence
in juries.276  For instance, when a jury makes a decision by general verdict
269. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 435.  However, when discussing a reasoning
requirement for judges, Allen & Seniuk argue, “For there to be “reasons” there must be
some sort of standard that makes the reasons effective.  In the absence of such stan-
dards, any articulated “reason” merely calls for yet another level of “reasons” to be given
to justify the first, and so on ad infinitum.”  Allen & Seniuk, supra note 161, at 75.
270. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 615– 16. R
271. Id. at 616.
272. Cohen, supra note 76, at 435.
273. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 620. R
274. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xx
(2015); Alex Kozinski & John Major, Jurors on Film: Why Putting Cameras in the Jury
Room Is Not as Crazy as You Think, 99 JUDICATURE 7, 10– 11 (2015) (arguing that juror
deliberations should be videotaped as the knowledge of being videotaped might improve
juror behavior, reveal juror misconduct, help researchers understand what aspects of the
trial could be improved upon, give lawyers performance feedback, help judges deter-
mine whether trial error was prejudicial or harmless, and help judges to understand the
effect of prosecutorial misconduct on jurors’ decision making).
275. Doron Menashe, supra note 111, at 231– 32. R
276. Wright, supra note 90, at 422– 34. R
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that the public does not support,277 and the public cannot follow its rea-
soning, the public may not trust that the decision making was sound.278
C. Administrative and Procedural Considerations
In addition to the substantive costs and benefits of reasoned and spe-
cial verdicts, there are also administrative considerations.  Commentators
on the use of reasoned verdicts in Spain point to their potential for effi-
ciency.279  Thaman argues, “A properly constructed question list will shed
considerable light on how the jury decided the case because it reveals, at
least, which facts have been proved to its satisfaction.”280  One need not
guess at the reasoning in convoluted appeals.  Of course, this benefit of
reasoned verdicts is highly reliant on properly constructed question lists,
and question lists are not standardized.  The quality of the question lists
and verdict sheets vary widely.  Such questions might contain weaknesses,
may be too long, and may be too complex.281  As Thaman acknowledges,
“Even the most astutely drafted question list will not necessarily reveal why
the jurors found the particular facts proved.”282  Differentiating between
good and bad question lists might be possible only in hindsight.
Practical experience with reasoned verdicts has been mixed.  Problems
have included insufficiency of jury reason-giving, wide discretion in the
review of reasons by judges, and the undermining of jury indepen-
277. See, e.g., Mikaela Conley, Public Irate Over Casey Anthony Verdict; Social Media
Sites Explode With Opinions, ABC NEWS (July 5, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
casey-anthony-verdict-outrage-spills-online/story?id=14002257 [https://perma.cc/
P8DZ-G8LH] (describing public reaction to Casey Anthony jury verdict); Leaders, Com-
munity React to Jury’s Acquittal in Yanez Case, CBS MINNESOTA (June 16, 2017), http://
minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/06/16/community-reaction-castile-yanez/ [https://
perma.cc/8VX9-P24H] (describing public reaction to acquittal in police killing of Phi-
lando Castile); Reaction Pours in to Zimmerman Verdict, CNN (July 16, 2013), http://
www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/07/us/zimmerman-verdict-reax/ [https://perma.cc/
A9C7-JM4T] (providing public reaction to George Zimmerman’s acquittal on charges
relating to his killing of Trayvon Martin).
278. It is good to be mindful of the fact that the general public often gets information
from the media, and not the courts.  Jurors hear lengthy testimony, and are exposed to
evidence that may not be accessible to the media, and jurors’ deliberations are private.
Thus, the public may disagree with a verdict because they are making an assessment
about guilt without all of the information.  Email from Nancy S. Marder, Professor of
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to Kayla A. Burd, Human Development, Cornell Uni-
versity & Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Sept. 26, 2017) (on file
with authors).
279. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 660– 65. R
280. Id. at 646.
281. Thaman describes variability in the drafting of the question lists for the verdict
forms in Spain.  Some questions and verdict forms are concise and include fewer than
ten questions.  Other forms have included complex, multi-part questions and have con-
tained up to ninety-six questions.  Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 352.  Judges
sometimes construct long narratives containing multiple elements, but it could be diffi-
cult to answer such questions with a simple yes or no as jurors may agree only with
some of the elements presented but are asked to make a global decision about them. See
Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 13, at 370.
282. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 646. R
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dence.283  In a field study of Italian mixed courts, both professional and
lay judges voiced the view that the reasoning requirements negatively
affected lay participation and made it harder for laypersons to contribute
in a meaningful way.284  Lay judges, who typically have no legal training,
often have difficulty expressing their views in terms of the legal concepts,
and therefore, such arguments are often rejected.285
At one time, early in the introduction of the Spanish jury, more than
fifty percent of all reasoned jury verdicts in Spain were deemed to be inade-
quately reasoned.286  In early Spanish jury trials which required reasoned
verdicts, judges lacked experience and had difficulty drafting verdict sheets
and explaining procedures to jurors.287  In one case, that difficulty resulted
in an acquittal as the jury was asked ninety-eight questions, and many of
the questions contained multiple premises that the jury was asked to con-
sider.288  However, the acquittal was eventually reversed as the court found
that the jurors provided insufficient reasons.289  Here, the court reviewed
the jurors’ reasoning and concluded that they had not fully explained their
decision in the case in spite of responding to ninety-eight questions.290
In Austria, where jurors receive no assistance in drafting their reasons,
the reasons they provide are not thought to be very strong or “enlightening”
typically.291  Greg Taylor concluded that in regard to the reasoning require-
ment in Austria, “a lack of full reasons for a verdict is an immanent feature
of trial by jury.”292  The reasons jurors provide are often “confined to a few
words (such as ‘the evidence and the responses of the accused’) or even a
single word (‘evidence’).”293  This example also illustrates that the process
of drafting verdict questions may cause additional difficulties compared to
a general verdict.  Clearly, the ability of juries to make sound and binding
decisions hinges on both proper questions posed to the jury and reasona-
ble judicial expectations of jury reasoning.
In a parallel context, several procedural and administrative considera-
tions accompany special verdict forms.  As with European reasoned jury
verdicts, cases involving special verdicts or general verdicts with written
questions pose practical problems.  Kimberly Moore argues that in her
review of special verdicts in patent cases, the majority of questions posed
283. Id. at 630– 32.
284. Hans & Jolivet, supra note 74, at 198 (summarizing field research finding that
both lay and professional judges agree that legal requirements in reasoning make it more
difficult for lay judges to meaningfully contribute).
285. Id. at 198– 200.
286. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 773.
287. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 631. R
288. Id. at 636– 39.
289. See id.; Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 639; Thaman, Spain
Returns, supra note 13, at 372.
290. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 636– 39; see Thaman, Spain
Returns, supra note 13, at 372– 73.
291. See Taylor, supra note 56, at 305– 06. R
292. Id. at 305.
293. Id. at 306.
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to jurors were “not meaningfully drafted.”294  Moore found that many spe-
cial verdict forms “actually denoted . . . how to answer questions so as to
result in a win for a particular party” rather than emphasizing an under-
standing of the facts at hand.295  This could be positive because jurors
would understand the implications of what they are deciding, but it might
also draw their attention away from a determination of the specific facts.
In some death penalty cases in which juries were asked to respond to writ-
ten questions about aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
sentences were overturned on the grounds that the wording of the verdict
forms was misleading.296
As another example of problematic issues with form construction, in
Taxquet, the Grand Chamber determined that “neither the indictment nor
the questions to the jury contained sufficient information as to the appli-
cant’s involvement. . . .”297  This illustrates that the framing of questions—
and not just juror responses and reasoning— is procedurally important.
Furthermore, as noted above, the Grand Chamber argued that the ques-
tions posed to jurors in Taxquet did not allow the defendant a clear under-
standing of what evidence and case facts led jurors to their verdicts.298
Judges seem to be given little guidance in the way of drafting special verdict
sheets and in helping facilitate juror understanding of these complex
materials.
Generally, special and reasoned verdicts require courts to write ques-
tions for every case.  This process is time consuming, and it is not stan-
dardized.  While in theory it may be possible to write strong, clear
questions for special and reasoned verdicts, their adequacy— or inade-
quacy— may only be apparent in hindsight.  In addition, differences exist
between the approaches that judges use when considering jurors’ reasons.
As noted earlier, some judges in Spain utilize the maximalist approach and
require much from jurors in terms of reasons, while other judges utilize the
minimalist approach and expect very little from jurors.299  These
approaches, too, are not standardized and thus leave much room for varia-
bility in judges’ interpretations and acceptance or rejection of jurors’ rea-
soning.  In determining the sufficiency of reasons given for verdicts,
Spain’s judges must handle such issues on a case-by-case basis through
294. Kimberly A. Moore, Essay: Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 779, 783 (2002) (citing Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989,
994 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
295. Id. at 785.  The special verdict form in one case included the parties’ names next
to “yes” and “no” such that jurors did not need to, in Moore’s view, understand or ana-
lyze the facts to determine the answer to the questions; instead, jurors could just pick the
party they wanted to win.
296. Nepveu, supra note 18, at 284 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988);
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)).  In these cases, the Supreme Court
“overturned death sentences that resulted from special interrogatories that either
implied or required unanimity as to mitigating circumstances.”
297. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 626, (quoting Taxquet v. R
Belgium, App. No. 926/05, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 145, 148).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 634.
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appeal procedures in the Supreme Court.300
D. Summary of the Implications of Psychological Research for the
Reasoned Verdicts Debate
Current legal theory assumes that reasoned verdicts promote sound
juror and jury decision making, and empirical research can help us evalu-
ate these claims.  Determining whether reasoned or general verdicts are
stronger is both an empirical and normative question.301  Overall, despite
some potential benefits, scholars argue that there are costs to requiring
jurors to provide reasons for their verdicts.  Thaman points out that “Amer-
ican courts have, by and large, rejected special verdicts because they allow
the judge too much control over how the jury logically assesses the facts
and the law in the case.”302  Similarly, requiring reasons undermines jury
independence, opens the door to external influences over juror decision
making, can be impractical and/or procedurally difficult to enact, and may
simply cause jurors to struggle with the burden of providing reasons for
their judgments.
The psychological research explored in this Article offers some insight
into the strengths and limitations of these verdict options.  Requiring rea-
sons may not provide us with the actual reasons that drove juror decision
making.  When these reasons are drafted post hoc, jurors may not be aware
of what factors actually guided their decision making, but when prompted
to provide reasons, they may create ones that seem to fit.  Jurors may dis-
tort incoming information to match a preexisting belief.  Research also sug-
gests that deep moral and emotional intuitions often drive individuals’
judgments.  These factors may not be accurately reflected in their reasons.
We also know that the framing of questions is critically important.
Even when two options are objectively equivalent, the way they are written
can change the way they are interpreted.  As such, objectively equivalent
statements might be processed differently because they are subjectively
perceived to be different.  In this context, the framing of questions for
jurors to answer may substantially shift jurors’ processing of information
and decision making, but not necessarily in a better direction.  Question
order in verdict sheets really matters.  Poorly sequenced questions may
300. Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line, supra note 11, at 767– 70.
301. Even if empirical research suggests that one verdict form leads to better decision-
making than another, we must still balance decision accuracy with other important val-
ues (e.g., jury independence). See E-mail from Zachary Clopton, Assistant Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School, to Kayla A. Burd, Human Development, Cornell University &
Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Sept. 29, 2017) (on file with
authors).  Furthermore, if empirical research suggested that there is no difference in
decision accuracy amongst these different verdict procedures, perhaps the procedures
would remain unchanged in the U.S. as a means of preserving jury independence. See
id.  Further, because each of these values requires a trade-off, even if empirical evidence
suggests that one form is better than another, we might still resist procedural changes in
favor of another value. See E-mail from Nancy S. Marder, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, to Kayla A. Burd, Human Development, Cornell University & Valerie P.
Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Sept. 26, 2017) (on file with authors).
302. Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 616. R
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lead to worse outcomes.  We must identify which questions are important
to ask and how the sequence and framing of questions affects jurors’
decisions.
Psychological research also suggests that general verdicts with unstruc-
tured deliberation are already conducive to careful jury decision mak-
ing.303  First, the research shows there is strength in juror decisions made
following global versus item-by-item analysis of case facts.304  Allowing
jurors to freely construct narratives of trial evidence leads to stronger deci-
sions more in line with the evidence than asking jurors to make decisions
after evidence has been provided by legal issue.  This suggests that struc-
turing jurors’ decision-making process may not be helpful.  Second, even
when asked to follow a structured process of decision making, such as
occurs with special verdict forms, jurors are apt to make holistic decisions
about the case first and then to generate reasoning post hoc.
We conclude that general verdicts appear to be the best choice when
we take into account the strength of jurors’ decisions and accuracy, jury
independence, and procedural efficiency and standardization.  Research
shows that jurors are already thoughtful and reason deeply about the evi-
dence during their deliberations, making stronger decisions when allowed
to create narratives of the evidence spontaneously.305  Further, juries can
maintain the most power and independence, and remain the most immune
to external influence with less interference from the courts.  Lastly, general
verdicts are efficient and standardized across courts.
However, reasoned verdicts have their attractions, considering how the
provision of reasons assists judicial review and could potentially enhance
perceptions of the verdict’s legitimacy.  Making juries’ reasoning known to
the courts could improve transparency in the justice system.  Litigants who
have information about the reasons underlying their verdicts would have a
better understanding of the grounds for the decision.306  Lastly, reviewabil-
ity could make more apparent situations where jurors did not vote in line
with the evidence, and judges might be able to rectify these mistakes.
At this current point, it is difficult to know whether and under what
circumstances requiring reasons is helpful to jurors.  Psychological
research suggests that decisions are often a mix of intuition and delibera-
tive reasoning.307  Intuition often precedes deliberative processing, and we
cannot be sure that requiring reasons of jurors will increase deliberative
processing in jurors.  Reasoned, special, and general verdicts offer their
own sets of potential strengths and weaknesses.  These alternatives should
be studied empirically in order to explore which type of verdict yields the
best juror decision making and reasoning.
303. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 136, at 203.
304. See id. at 197, 202– 03.
305. See id. at 195, 202.
306. Kozinski, supra note 274, at xviii, xx. R
307. See Robin M. Hogarth, Intuition: A Challenge for Psychological Research on Deci-
sion Making, 21 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 338, 346 (2010).
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Conclusion
In theory, reasoned verdicts could make the trial process more trans-
parent, increasing confidence in and perceptions of legitimacy in the jury
system.  However, based on the psychological literature discussed above, it
is prudent to be cautious about the introduction of reasoned verdicts, as
requiring reasons may disrupt juror decision making in unanticipated
ways.
Jurors are lay fact-finders, untrained in the complexities of law and
legal rules, and yet reasoned verdicts require that their reasons conform
precisely to the law.  This difficulty is the impetus for additional interac-
tion with the court, as jurors must often call on legal assistance when draft-
ing their verdicts.  This necessity undermines the independence and power
of jurors and opens the door for external pressures and biases to encroach
on jurors’ decisions.  When judges overturn jury verdicts that they con-
sider insufficiently reasoned, judges substitute their judgments for those of
the jurors.  In addition, reasoned verdicts may lead to post hoc rational-
izing rather than predecisional reasoning, and can be subject to poor fram-
ing and question construction.
The procedural difficulties associated with reasoned verdicts may out-
weigh the potential benefits.  We described the experience in Spain, for
example, where substantial numbers of cases have been overturned as the
courts found jurors’ written documentation of their reasoning to be incon-
sistent or insufficient.308  Too little attention has been given to the con-
struction of the verdict forms provided to jurors.  Verdict forms used in
these situations are not standardized, leaving room for variability in their
quality.  Furthermore, because the way that verdict forms are structured
may deeply impact juror decision making as discussed above, this lack of
standardization means that jurors might reach different decisions depend-
ing on the construction of the verdict forms.  Requiring reasons in the man-
ner described above may cause administrative headaches or procedural
inconsistencies.  Although the need to provide reasons for verdicts is
assumed to improve juror decision making, it may have no discernible
effect or could even undermine decision quality.  At the very least, much
attention should be given to the construction of the verdict sheets given to
jurors.
Psychological research casts some doubt on the necessity and wisdom
of requiring juries to provide reasons for their verdicts.  Based on the psy-
chological research mentioned above, reasoned and general verdicts may
differ substantially in process but may not always differ in outcome.  How-
ever, evidence from Pennington and Hastie suggest that allowing jurors to
deliberate freely produces the strongest decisions and increases juror confi-
dence.309  Because no empirical studies have examined differences
between jurors’ decisions when rendering general versus reasoned verdicts,
we cannot be sure which verdict approach produces the strongest deci-
308. See Thaman, The Spanish Experience, supra note 1, at 631.
309. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 136, at 202. R
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sions.  For these reasons, we do not advocate for the expansion of reasoned
verdicts.
This is an area ripe for empirical research.  Research comparing the
cognitive processes and verdict consequences of reasoned and general ver-
dicts is sorely needed.  Research could also help legal professionals draft
optimal sets of questions.  If empirical research reveals that the outcomes
of general and reasoned verdicts are similar, the independence and
strength of general verdicts should be preserved.
Casper argues that as we consider structuring decision making, we
must strike a balance between competing goals:
The drive toward rationality and predictability is certainly understandable,
but it cannot govern our choices totally, for it is an unattainable goal,
whether the decisionmaker is a judge, a jury, or some other institution.
Moreover, as normative propositions, rationality and predictability are not
the only goals. . . .310
Ultimately, it seems a worthy goal to maximize jurors’ decision making
while insulating such decisions from external influences.  Requiring rea-
sons of jurors may well change how jurors make decisions, but without
empirical research, we cannot know if these changes are for the better.
Requiring reasons of jurors may not be the panacea we desire, but it seems
clear that it will undermine the independence of jurors and juries.
310. Casper, supra note 98, at 450– 51.
